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Abstract
We analyze the relationship between pre-colonial warfare and long-run development patterns in
India. We construct a new geocoded database of historical interstate conflicts on the Indian sub-
continent, from which we compute measures of local exposure to pre-colonial warfare. We doc-
ument a positive and significant relationship between pre-colonial conflict exposure and local
economic development across India today. This result is robust to numerous checks, including
controls for geographic endowments, initial state capacity, colonial-era institutions, ethnic and
religious fractionalization, and colonial and post-colonial conflict, and an instrumental vari-
ables strategy that exploits variation in pre-colonial conflict exposure driven by cost distance to
the Khyber Pass. Drawing on rich archival and secondary data, we show that districts that were
more exposed to pre-colonial conflict experienced greater local pre-colonial and colonial-era
state-making, and less political violence and higher infrastructure investments in the long term.
We argue that reductions in local levels of violence and greater investments in physical capital
were at least in part a function of more powerful local government institutions.
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1 Introduction
According to a well-known literature, governments undertook institutional reforms in order to en-
hance their military prowess in the face of interstate competition (Mann, 1984; Brewer, 1989; Tilly,
1992; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015). In time, more powerful government institutions may have helped
promote long-run economic development through the greater provision of domestic security and
other basic public goods (Besley and Persson, 2011; Morris, 2014). Much of this literature, however,
centers on the historical experience of Western Europe.
In this study, we recast the “military competition” framework to provide a novel explanation of
local development patterns across India today. For hundreds of years prior to European colonial
rule, rival states competed for political dominance on the Indian subcontinent (Roy, 1994; Gom-
mans, 1999; de la Garza, 2016). We construct a new geocoded database of historical interstate con-
flicts in this context. To proxy for local exposure to pre-colonial interstate military competition, we
compute a benchmark measure in which a district’s exposure is increasing in its physical proxim-
ity to pre-colonial conflicts between the years 1000 and 1757. Consistent with the logic described
above, our empirical analysis reveals a positive and significant relationship between pre-colonial
conflict exposure and local economic development. This result sheds new light on the historical
roots of Indian development patterns.
To test the robustness of this relationship, we perform numerous checks. First, we restrict our
analysis to within-state variation by including state fixed effects, to show that time-invariant fea-
tures specific to Indian states do not drive our results. Second, we control for a wide range of local
geographic features, including climate, terrain ruggedness, soil suitability, disease environments,
and waterway access. Third, we perform an instrumental variables analysis that exploits variation
in pre-colonial conflict exposure driven by cost distance to the Khyber Pass, the main historical
route of invaders from Central Asia into India. Fourth, we show that pre-colonial conflict expo-
sure significantly predicts local development levels today above and beyond the role of colonial-
era institutions such as direct British rule and non-landlord revenue systems. We show that this
relationship continues to hold after controlling for initial state capacity levels, ethnic and religious
fractionalization, and colonial-era and post-colonial conflict exposure. Fifth, we demonstrate that
our main results are robust to alternative ways of operationalizing local exposure to pre-colonial
interstate military competition that take into account faraway conflicts by exploiting information
about the pre-colonial states that participated in them.
We next analyze the channels through which pre-colonial warfare may have influenced long-
run development patterns in India. We argue that reductions in local levels of violence and greater
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investments in physical capital were functions – at least in part – of more powerful local government
institutions. Drawing on rich data from both archival and secondary sources, we show evidence for
a significant relationship between local exposure to pre-colonial conflict and diverse measures of
pre-colonial and colonial-era state-making, as well as long-term reductions in political violence.
Furthermore, we show that pre-colonial conflict exposure significantly predicts larger investments
in physical capital (i.e., irrigation infrastructure) in the long term.
Our study provides new evidence that the “military competition” framework applies outside
Western Europe, at least in India. A recent literature has explored the relationship between in-
terstate military competition and long-run state capacity in India (Roy, 2013; Gupta, Ma and Roy,
2016; Foa, 2016). We go further in several ways. First, we analyze the long-run implications of his-
torical warfare in India for economic development. Here, we view local state capacity as a means
through which pre-colonial conflict exposure may have influenced local development patterns,
and not simply as an end in and of itself. In this respect, our theoretical framework and empirical
analysis go beyond classic arguments such as those by Tilly (1992), which primarily focus on the
relationship between warfare and state-making. Second, we construct a new geocoded database
of historical interstate conflicts on the Indian subcontinent. Third, we compile a rich array of new
data to evaluate pre-colonial and colonial outcomes. Thus, the scope of our analysis is significantly
wider than the previous literature.
Of equal importance, our study casts new light on the deep roots of Indian development pat-
terns. The vast majority of the literature analyzes the role of British colonialism (Banerjee and
Iyer, 2005; Iyer, 2010; Bharadwaj and Mirza, 2017; Castello´-Climent, Chaudhary and Mukhopad-
hyay, 2017; Chaudhary et al., 2018; Lee, 2018). Our empirical analysis evaluates the importance of
colonial factors in several ways. Yet it highlights the role of pre-colonial events in India, which the
literature tends to overlook. Namely, our argument that pre-colonial conflict exposure promoted
local pre-colonial and colonial-era state-making, and less political violence and higher investments
in physical infrastructure in the long term, provides a novel explanation for local development pat-
terns in India.
There is a growing literature about the significance of pre-colonial factors such as state capac-
ity for long-run development (Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013;
Dell, Lane and Querubin, 2018). Among these papers, ours is one of the first to systematically ana-
lyze the long-run development consequences of pre-colonial history in India. Furthermore, unlike
much of the literature, we focus on the long-run consequences of pre-colonial warfare, rather than
pre-colonial levels of state capacity – which, according to our argument, was actually an outcome
of prior military conflict. We show evidence in support of this view. In this manner, our study ex-
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tends the literature by shedding new light on the historical roots of state capacity in the developing
world.
Finally, there is a growing body of quantitatively-oriented research on pre-colonial India (Jha,
2013; Gaikwad, 2014; Iyer, Shrivastava and Ticku, 2017), to which our study brings the role of pre-
colonial interstate military competition and warfare on long-run development patterns. We pro-
vide new insights about the pre-colonial military roots of current economic differences across In-
dia.
We organize this study as follows. In the next section, we develop our theoretical framework.
Section 3 contains the historical background, and Section 4 a description of the data. In Section
5, we present the empirical strategy and main results, and in Section 6 the tests for robustness. In
Section 7, we analyze potential channels. We provide concluding remarks about how our study
helps clarify the conditions under which war “makes” states and promotes economic development
in Section 8.
2 Theoretical Framework
We now develop a simple theoretical framework to explain how pre-colonial events in India may
influence contemporary economic outcomes. First, we characterize the “military competition”
framework in general terms. Second, we apply this framework to the Indian context. Our argu-
ment produces a set of predictions which will guide our empirical analysis.
2.1 General Argument
Interstate warfare is a common explanation for long-run state-making. We characterize the general
logic of this argument as follows (Besley and Persson, 2011, 58-9). Protection from foreign attack is
a public good typically provided by the government. To improve the government’s ability to fend off
foreign attacks, individuals may demand new investments in defense, and be willing to pay more
in taxes to fund it. In this manner, the threat of foreign attack may drive higher tax revenue, along
with a more robust public administration to help organize the government’s fiscal and military
efforts.1 If there are recurring threats, then institutional reforms may continue in ratchet-like steps
(Rasler and Thompson, 2005, 491-3). Once the government has decided to overcome the high fixed
costs of increasing its defense capacity, then it should be inexpensive at the margin to maintain its
enhanced activity levels. Thus, more powerful government institutions may stay in place even after
foreign threats dissipate.
1This logic should hold so long as large financial resources matter to battlefield success (Gennaioli and Voth, 2015). As
we will describe in Section 3, money played a key role in interstate military competition in the context of pre-colonial
India.
4
In time, a more powerful government may help promote long-run economic development via at
least two channels. The first channel is the greater provision of domestic security. A more powerful
government should be better at maintaining domestic law and order (Morris, 2014, 3-26). If there
is a reduction in levels of internal violence, then individuals will be more willing to make growth-
enhancing investments (North, 1981, 24-6). The second channel is the provision of other public
goods that depend on a less violent domestic environment (Dincecco, 2017, 11-13). For example, a
more powerful government may provide agricultural infrastructure such as irrigation that improves
crop yields.
Given that warfare can destroy physical and human capital, greater interstate military competi-
tion may actually reduce the long-run prospects for economic development. Here, it makes sense
to distinguish between the short-run and long-run economic implications of interstate military
competition. Namely, while warfare may be destructive over the short run, the economic bene-
fits that may derive from competition-related institutional reforms – as characterized in the two
channels above – may eventually outweigh such destruction over the long run.2
2.2 Application to India
As described in Section 1, the “military competition” framework centers on the historical experi-
ence of Western Europe. Yet there is also reason to think that this general logic may apply in India.
As in early modern Europe, political fragmentation, instability, and interstate military competition
were recurrent features of the landscape of pre-colonial India (Tilly, 1992, 45, de la Garza, 2016,
12). Similarly, large fiscal resources played an important role in military success in both contexts
(Gennaioli and Voth, 2015; Roy, 1994). Finally, population density was high enough in both early
modern Europe and pre-colonial India to make territorial conquest through battle a worthwhile
endeavor (Herbst, 2000, 13-16). Thus, the logic by which greater levels of interstate military com-
petition may have promoted local institutional reforms should have held within pre-colonial India.
We will provide further historical evidence in support of the above claims in Section 3.
Local institutional reforms made in response to interstate military competition in pre-colonial
India may have endured across the colonial and post-colonial eras, as new regimes took advantage
of traditional institutional structures, rather than trying to build new ones from scratch. Between
the mid-eighteenth century and the mid-nineteenth century, the British East India Company be-
came the dominant political power on the Indian subcontinent (Dutt, 1950, 1-2; Gommans, 1999,
120). However, the total influx of British settlers to India was relatively small (Iyer, 2010, 697). Thus,
2According to Centeno and Enriquez (2016, 124), even the short-run destruction of warfare may bring economic benefits,
to the extent that it reduces reliance on outdated technology and reallocates public spending toward infrastructure
investments.
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British colonialists had incentives to establish indirect forms of rule, under which traditional local
leaders retained ample control over internal governance matters – particularly in zones with well-
developed pre-colonial institutions (James, 1997, 326-33; Gerring et al., 2011, 380-7; Hariri, 2012,
473-4). Lange (2004, 909) writes that “the minimal colonial state created local conditions in both
the directly and indirectly ruled areas of colonial India that were quite similar to those in indirectly
ruled Africa.” Princely states (i.e., “Native” states) ruled by hereditary kings spanned 45 percent of
British India (Iyer, 2010, 694), while colonial dependence on “customary” (i.e., traditional) courts
was 60 percent (Lange, 2004, 909).
By relying on existing local institutions, the British could reduce overall governance costs. We
may therefore expect local pre-colonial institutions to have endured into the colonial era. For ex-
ample, the British East India Company was able to quickly extract sizeable tributes following its
victories in the Third and Fourth British-Mysore Wars in the late eighteenth century (Roy, 2011,
65-6). This example speaks to the fiscal strength of the pre-colonial Mysore Kingdom, as well as to
colonial Britain’s practice of exploiting traditional local institutions for their benefit. Similarly, to
increase revenue collection following defeat in the Third British-Mysore War, the Mysore ruler Tipu
Sultan replaced traditional tax farmers with non-local bureaucrats. This reform became an impor-
tant feature of later British colonial governance (Stein, 1985, 406, Roy, 2011, 75). Nonetheless, our
empirical analysis will control for colonial institutions such as direct British rule (Iyer, 2010) and
non-landlord revenue systems (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005).
In 1947, India became independent of British rule. A single federal government characterizes
post-colonial India. Still, the traditional strength of local governance structures could influence
the local effectiveness of national-level institutions, particularly given the decentralized nature of
India’s federal government, as well as India’s vast geographic scale. In this manner, pre-colonial
institutional structures could continue to influence long-run local development outcomes into the
modern era.
2.3 Empirical Predictions
When applied to the Indian context, therefore, the “military competition” framework produces sev-
eral predictions. The main “reduced-form” prediction is that there should be a positive and signif-
icant relationship between pre-colonial conflict exposure and current economic development lev-
els in India. The logic is as follows. If a given zone in India experienced more pre-colonial warfare,
then we would expect more powerful local government institutions to have emerged there, which
in turn would have helped promote local long-run economic development.
Our argument produces three further predictions that reflect the channels through which the
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main prediction may have operated. The first such prediction is that greater pre-colonial conflict
exposure should be associated with pre-colonial and colonial-era state-making. A related predic-
tion is that there should be a negative and significant relationship between pre-colonial conflict
exposure and (eventual) political violence levels. A final prediction is that there should be a pos-
itive and significant relationship between pre-colonial conflict exposure and subsequent invest-
ments in physical capital such as irrigation infrastructure that depend on a less violent domestic
environment.
We will rely on these four predictions to guide our empirical analysis.
3 Historical Background
Our theoretical framework predicts that, if a given zone in India experienced more pre-colonial
warfare, then we would expect more powerful local bureaucratic and fiscal institutions to have
emerged there, which in turn would have helped promote local economic development over the
long run. We now provide historical evidence regarding the relationship between interstate military
competition and institutional development in pre-colonial India in support of this framework.
There were numerous independent states on the Indian subcontinent circa 1000, the start year
of our analysis (Nag, 2007, 28), and political fragmentation was an enduring feature (de la Garza,
2016, 12).3 By the early sixteenth century, major rival states included the Delhi Sultanate, the Rajput
states, the Deccan Sultanates, and the Vijayanagar Empire (Roy, 1994, 57).
Each of these pre-colonial states was capable of mobilizing a large military (Roy, 1994, 57-70).
Sultan Alauddin Khilji of Delhi reportedly had 475,000 cavalry troops, and the Vijayanagar Empire
a million-person army. There is also evidence of institutional development in response to exter-
nal threats. Under King Krishna Devaraya, for example, the Vijayanagar Empire introduced new
weaponry and cavalry, and expanded state control by establishing new military garrisons.
Between 1526 and 1707, the Mughal Empire was among the most powerful states on the Indian
subcontinent (Richards, 1995, 1, 6-9; de la Garza, 2016, 1). This Empire was established by Babur,
who after several attempts defeated the Afghan state led by Ibrahim Lodi in 1526. The next year,
Babur’s relatively small army defeated a large Rajput confederacy of 80,000 cavalry troops and 500
war elephants, helping establish Mughal political control over northern India.
According to Nath (2018, 245), “The Mughals fought their enemies ceaselessly. . . war was a con-
3We take 1000 as the start year for synchronicity with the case of Western Europe, which provides the backdrop for
our analysis. There, the turn of the first millennium marked the approximate onset of political fragmentation after
the demise of the Carolingian Empire (Strayer, 1970, 15). It was in this context that the logic of interstate military
competition became relevant.
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stant preoccupation of the Mughal Empire.” The Mughal Empire reached new heights under Ak-
bar, who ruled from 1556 to 1605 (Richards, 1995, 12-28). During his long reign, Akbar conquered
numerous rival kings and local strongmen, enabling the Mughals to further solidify their political
control over the northern and western parts of India.
The Mughals committed significant fiscal resources to war-making (de la Garza, 2016, 1; Nath,
2018, 253-5). Describing the 1596 state budget, for example, Richards (1995, 75) writes that “by far
the greater part of this budget was devoted to supporting a massive military establishment.” More
than 80 percent of total state expenditure was granted to Mughal military officials called mansab-
dars, while another 9 percent was devoted to the central military establishment (Richards, 1995,
75-6). By contrast, annual spending on the Mughal imperial household was less than 5 percent.
To help manage Mughal military affairs, Akbar implemented new bureaucratic and fiscal struc-
tures (Richards, 1995, 58-9; de la Garza, 2016, 6). Under the institutional innovation of the mans-
abdari-jagirdari system, Akbar granted land to military officials in order to extract surplus agricul-
tural output (Nath, 2018, 253-5). Data available for the late 1680s indicate that the top 6 percent
of military officials (roughly 450 persons) were in possession of more than 60 percent of total tax
revenue, indicating a high degree of bureaucratic and fiscal centralization under a small military
elite (Qaisar, 1998, 255-6). A large portion of these funds were spent on the military.
Furthermore, Mughal government officials developed a “pyramid” treasury system that linked
the central treasury with those in provincial capitals and other towns (Richards, 1995, 69-71). Akbar
exploited this bureaucratic innovation to quickly move funds during conflicts. Richards (1995, 70)
writes that the “swift dispatch of treasure gave his armies the means and morale for victory.”
The zabt land tax revenue system was another Mughal institutional innovation (Richards, 1995,
187-90). In the late sixteenth century, the state began to overhaul the land tax revenue system, in-
creasing bureaucratic centralization and introducing better agricultural data. By enabling the state
bureaucracy to deal directly with individual farmers, the zabt system helped reduce the traditional
tax power of local landowners called zamindars. The zabt system further improved the ability of
the Mughal state to extract agricultural output and finance the military. Moreover, the system may
have incentivized farmers to shift production to high-value cash crops, thereby promoting rural
economic development.
The Mughal Empire fell into decline at the start of the eighteenth century (Richards, 1995, 253-
81). Drawing on the various institutional legacies that the Mughals left behind, indigenous king-
doms including the Maratha, Mysore, and Travancore began to compete for political control with
the British East India Company (Roy, 1994, 37-50; Roy, 2011, 95-102). In this context, states un-
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dertook major institutional reforms (Stein, 1985, 391; Roy, 1994, 37-50; Ramusack, 2003, 12; Roy,
2011). In Travancore, for example, King Marthanda Varma established a “warrior state” during the
1730s and 1740s, characterized by a larger bureaucracy and a more centralized tax system capable
of extracting greater revenue (Foa, 2016, 93-4). Describing this system, Foa (2016, 94) writes that
the “flow of revenues to the center allowed the state to build a highly centralized military force, as
well as to invest large sums on the construction of fortifications, temples, and palaces.” In 1741, the
Travancore military defeated the Dutch East India Company (Foa, 2016, 94).
Victory at the Battle of Plassey in 1757 helped establish the British East India Company as a ma-
jor political entity on the Indian subcontinent (Dutt, 1950, 1-2; de la Garza, 2016, 12). Over the next
century, the East India Company systematically defeated its rivals in India, including indigenous
states such as the Marathas, Mysores, and Sikhs, along with foreign powers such as the Dutch and
French (Dutt, 1950, 1-2; Gommans, 1999, 120).
Overall, this historical evidence links interstate military competition and recurrent warfare in
pre-colonial India to bureaucratic and fiscal development and state capacity improvements. As
we have explained in Subsection 2.2, there is reason to think that local pre-colonial institutional
reforms made in response to interstate military competition endured across the colonial and post-
colonial eras. Through the (eventual) greater provision of domestic security and physical infras-





According to the theoretical framework in Section 2, higher local levels of interstate military com-
petition helped incentivize local institutional reforms in pre-colonial India. To proxy for local inter-
state military competition in this context, we use geocoded data on historical conflicts. The logic
here is that there was a meaningful link between the actual prevalence of local conflict and local
levels of interstate military competition in pre-colonial India.
We view local exposure to conflicts as the most straightforward way to measure the local extent
of interstate military competition in the pre-colonial context. We acknowledge, however, that this
approach may overlook conflicts that were fought at a large distance from a pre-colonial state’s po-
litical center, but nonetheless prompted institutional reforms there. In Section 6, we will describe
and test a set of alternative ways of operationalizing local interstate military competition that take
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into account faraway conflicts by exploiting information about the pre-colonial states that partici-
pated in them.
To construct our historical conflict database, we primarily rely on the book by Jaques (2007),
the goal of which is to document as many historical conflicts as possible (Jaques, 2007, xi). For
inclusion, a conflict must have been written down and cross-referenced with a minimum of two
independent sources (Jaques, 2007, xiii). Although this selection criteria will tend to exclude his-
torical conflicts known only through oral history, this potential shortcoming appears to be more
severe in pre-colonial Africa than in other world regions (Jaques, 2007, xi).
The conflict information in Jaques’ book is organized alphabetically by individual conflict names.
For each individual conflict, Jaques provides a paragraph-length description, including the type
(e.g., land battle), date, approximate duration (e.g., single-day), approximate location, and ma-
jor participants. For example, the first conflict in our database, named “Peshawar,” took place on
November 27, 1001 as part of the Muslim conquest of Northern India. Here, Mahmud of Ghazni
defeated Raja Jaipal of Punjab and his coalition of Hindu princes just outside the city of Peshawar.
To proxy for the location of this conflict, we assign the geographical coordinates of Peshawar (34◦
1’ 0” N, 71◦ 35’ 0” E).
Our database includes all individual conflicts – for example, land battles, sieges, and naval bat-
tles – on the Indian subcontinent between 1000 and 2010, as recorded by Jaques. For our bench-
mark measure of local exposure to pre-colonial conflicts (to be described in Subsection 4.1.2), we
focus on land battles, since they were by far the most common pre-colonial conflict type, and be-
cause they typically took place in the countryside, thereby reducing the likelihood that physical
capital would be destroyed. For robustness, we control for local exposure to: (1) pre-colonial sieges;
and (2) all pre-colonial conflict types in the Appendix (see Table A.3). The main results do not
change in either case, and there is no significant relationship between pre-colonial siege exposure
and current development.
By “Indian subcontinent,” we mean that we include conflict events that took place in the modern-
day nation of India plus the border nations of Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and
Sri Lanka. We exclude China, since historically the Himalayas limited interactions between China
and India. There were few if any historical interstate conflicts anywhere near China’s border with
India (Dincecco and Wang, 2018, 345). In the Appendix, we restrict our benchmark conflict expo-
sure measure to conflict events that took place within modern India only (Table A.3). The main
results remain unchanged. Appendix Figure A.1 maps the locations of the conflicts in our sample,
while Appendix Figure A.2 breaks them down by historical sub-period. We show that the main re-
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sults are robust if we restrict the conflict data to the sub-period of 1500 to 1757 in the Appendix (see
Table A.4).
To verify the breadth of our historical conflict coverage, we constructed alternative conflict data
according to similar procedures from two other independently-produced books, Clodfelter (2002)
and Naravane (1997). Clodfelter is a well-regarded source on historical conflicts, and covers the
globe from 1500 onward. Here, a key advantage of Jaques is that his conflict coverage extends much
further back in time. Nonetheless, the pre-colonial conflict coverage between 1500 and 1757 is
similar for Jaques and Clodfelter, providing support for the use of Jaques as our baseline source.
Naravane’s book focuses on battles in medieval India. While his coverage does expand on Jaques, it
lacks details on individual conflicts.4 Regardless, in the Appendix, we add the non-overlapping pre-
colonial data from Clodfelter and Naravane to our benchmark conflict exposure measure (Table
A.5). The main results remain significant.5
Although we systematically check the breadth of our conflict coverage, there may still be mea-
surement error. First, the available data do not enable us to systematically account for potential
differences in the intensity of pre-colonial conflicts. However, our primary focus on interstate con-
flicts – and in particular land battles as our benchmark measure – helps ensure that we are making
“apples-to-apples” comparisons between conflict events. Furthermore, interstate conflicts are ex-
actly the sort of conflict that the literature (e.g., Besley and Persson, 2011) indicates should matter
most for political and economic development. Nonetheless, in the Appendix, we show that the
main results remain robust if we include all pre-colonial conflict types as recorded by Jaques (Table
A.3).
Second, the quality and coverage of the historical conflict data may potentially vary by geo-
graphic zone. Our focus on interstate conflicts as described above helps reduce this potential
source of bias, since we are confident that Jaques (along with Clodfelter and Naravane) includes
the most important pre-colonial conflicts that historians have written about. Our regression analy-
sis accounts for potential differences in historical data quality and coverage across space in several
ways, including: (1) the use of fixed effects for Indian states (Table 1) or for grid cells (Appendix
Table A.6); (2) controls for initial state capacity (Appendix Table A.23); and (3) and the exclusion of
individual states (Appendix Figure A.6) or colonial provinces (Appendix Figure A.7) from our main
specification one at a time.
4We rely on Appendix B of Naravane’s book, which only lists the year, name, victor, and opponent of each medieval battle.
To identify conflict locations, we supplemented this information with online research.
5Brecke (1999) is another potential alternative source for historical conflict data. Relative to Jaques, however, there are
two main shortcomings of this work: (1) his data do not start until 1400; and (2) similar to Naravane, he does not provide
specific information about conflict locations.
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4.1.2 Benchmark Measure
As described in the previous subsection, we use geocoded historical conflict data to proxy for lo-
cal levels of interstate military competition in pre-colonial India, which may have influenced the
likelihood of local institutional reforms. To compute our benchmark measure of local exposure to




We measure distancei,c from the centroid of district i to the location of conflict c. The nearer a
district is to a particular conflict, the more exposed that district is. A conflict occurring at the district
centroid receives a full weight of one; this weight declines as distance increases. The parameter γ
controls the speed at which this decay occurs.6 To reduce the measure’s sensitivity to any single
conflict, we add one to distancei,c before taking the inverse.7
Our benchmark conflict exposure measure includes pre-colonial land battles between 1000 and
1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers, beyond which we assume that conflict exposure is
zero. Thus, pre-colonial conflict exposure to conflict c will only take a positive value for district i if
this conflict falls within a 250 kilometers radius from the centroid of this district. In the Appendix,
we use an alternative cutoff distance of 5,000 kilometers (Table A.7). Similarly, we use a variable
end-date cutoff that allows us to also include exposure to conflicts that took place after 1757 but
prior to British conquest of a district, for cases in which Banerjee and Iyer (2005) have coded the
date of conquest as taking place after 1757 (Table A.8).8 The coefficient estimates are very similar
in magnitude and significance to the main estimates across both checks .9
Figure 1 maps pre-colonial conflict exposure across Indian districts.10 This figure suggests that
there were four main geographic zones of pre-colonial conflict: (1) the far north in the vicinity of the
state of Punjab; (2) the western coast in the vicinity of Maharashtra; (3) the far east in the vicinity of
West Bengal; and (4) the lower southeast in the vicinity of Tamil Nadu.
6In our baseline analysis, we set γ equal to 1, but show that alternative levels of γ give similar results (not shown to save
space).
7If we did not add one to this measure, then a district in which a conflict took place very nearby would receive a very
large conflict exposure value, regardless of its proximity to any other conflicts.
8Specifically, this measure includes conflicts from 1000 to the (potentially post-1757) year of British annexation, which
differs by district.
9For further robustness, we exclude 155 districts for which our benchmark conflict exposure measures takes a value of
zero. The main results continue to hold (not shown to save space).
10Similarly, Appendix Figure A.3 maps the residualized conflict exposure measure after controlling for log population
density.
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Figure 1: Pre-Colonial Conflict Exposure by Indian Districts
Notes. This figure shows pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250
kilometers by district in India. Districts are shaded by decile: districts in the top decile receive the darkest shade.
4.2 Economic Development
To proxy for contemporary levels of development in India, we use nighttime luminosity data. Lu-
minosity is a common measure of local economic activity in relatively poor regions (e.g., Hender-
son, Storeygard and Weil, 2012; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013; Min, 2015, 51-73). We take
these data from the Operational Linescan System of the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
of the US Air Force. Satellite images are taken between 20:30 and 22:00 local time, and are averaged
over the year. These are reported in integer values from 0 to 63 for pixels at a 30-second (roughly
one square kilometer) resolution. We compute average luminosity across all square kilometer cells
within each district for every year between 1992 and 2010, and then take the district averages over
the entire 1992-2010 period. In the Appendix, we show the main results if we restrict the luminosity
data to each year from 1992 to 2010 (Figure A.8). The coefficients are always significant, with only
a small decline in magnitude over time.
Figure 2 maps average luminosity by district in India. This figure suggests that economic devel-
opment levels tend to be highest in the vicinity of the four main geographic zones of pre-colonial
conflict as described in the previous subsection. Appendix Figure A.4 indicates similar spatial pat-
terns for residualized luminosity after controlling for log population density. Thus, high luminosity
levels do not simply depend on dense populations. Still, to account for this possibility, our regres-
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Figure 2: Luminosity by Indian Districts
Notes. This figure shows average luminosity between 1992-2010 by district in India. Districts are shaded by decile: dis-
tricts in the top decile receive the darkest shade.
sion analysis will generally control for log population density.
Taken together, Figures 1 and 2 highlight the spatial correlation between pre-colonial conflict
exposure and local economic development today. To further test the strength of this relationship,
Appendix Figure A.5 plots pre-colonial conflict exposure against luminosity. There is a strong posi-
tive correlation between the two measures.
District-level GDP per capita data exist for India, but they have been constructed by a private
company, and differ from official sources such as the National Sample Surveys in their rankings
of districts on economic development outcomes. They are thus not widely used in the empirical
literature (Castello´-Climent, Chaudhary and Mukhopadhyay, 2017, 5). Nonetheless, we use them as
an alternative development outcome in the Appendix (see Table A.9). The main results are similar.
5 Pre-Colonial Warfare and Economic Development
5.1 Empirical Strategy
To analyze the relationship between pre-colonial conflict exposure and local development out-
comes across India, we estimate the following OLS specification:
Yi,j = βCon f lictExposurei,j + λPopDensityi,j + µj + X′i,jφ+ ei,j, (2)
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where i indexes districts and j indexes states in peninsular India.
We take the district as our main unit of analysis because it is the unit for which the most com-
prehensive data on outcomes, potential channels, and controls are available. District borders, how-
ever, are potentially outcomes of pre-colonial conflict exposure. In the Appendix, we show that the
main results are robust if we take grid cells as the unit of analysis rather than districts (Table A.10).
Yi,j measures local economic development levels in terms of luminosity. Following Michalopou-
los and Papaioannou (2013), we take the natural logarithm, adding a small number such that Yi,j ≡
ln(0.01+ Luminosityi,j). This log transformation reduces the range of the mean and variance of Yi,j,
and allows us to make use of all observations. In the Appendix, we show that the main results re-
main robust, however, if we: (1) take ln(1+ Luminosityi,j) rather than ln(0.01+ Luminosityi,j); (2)
keep Yi,j in its original linear form; or (3) take the inverse hyperbolic sine function (Table A.11).
Con f lictExposurei,j measures pre-colonial conflict exposure, our variable of interest. We always
report the original coefficient estimate β and the standardized beta coefficient.
PopDensityi,j controls for log population density in the most recent year available prior to the
year in which the dependent variable is measured.11 As noted in Subsection 4.2, local luminosity
levels in India do not simply reflect population density. Still, we follow the guidance in Michalopou-
los and Papaioannou (2018, 391) and include log population density as a control. This approach
allows us to interpret our results in terms of local differences in per capita living standards, without
the imposition of any prior restrictions on the luminosity-population elasticity.12 We thus believe
that the inclusion of log population density as a control outweighs the potential cost in terms of
post-treatment bias, given that dense populations may in part be outcomes of pre-colonial conflict
exposure. In the Appendix, however, we show that the main results continue to hold if we exclude
log population density (Table A.12). Similarly, they remain robust if we control for historical log
population density in 1000, the start year of our analysis (Appendix Table A.13). In both cases, the
coefficient estimates are larger than the main estimates, which suggests that we are taking a con-
servative approach by including log population density.
µj is the fixed effect for each of the 36 federal states (more precisely, 29 states and 7 union ter-
ritories). Modern state borders may in part be outcomes of pre-colonial conflict exposure. Thus,
including state fixed effects in our regression analysis may induce post-treatment bias. In our view,
11For the main regression analysis, this year is 1990. When the dependent variable is historical (e.g., 1881), then this
year is subject to data availability. The 1990 population data are taken from the Center for International Earth Science
Information Network (CIESIN) (http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/gpw), and the historical population data from
Klein Goldewijk et al. (2010).
12Furthermore, this approach enables us to directly test for potential non-linearities in log population density, which we
do by including the quadratic and cubic terms as a robustness check. The main results continue to hold (not shown to
save space).
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however, their inclusion outweighs this potential cost, since fixed effects help control for state-level
institutional and cultural features, along with potential measurement error in the quality and cov-
erage of the conflict data across space. Nonetheless, the main results remain robust if we exclude
the state fixed effects from the regression analysis (see column 1 of Table 1 ahead). Furthermore, in
the Appendix we show that the main results continue to hold if we use “exogenous” grid cell fixed
effects rather than state fixed effects (Table A.6).
Local geography may influence patterns of both pre-colonial conflict and economic develop-
ment alike. Geographic zones with mild climates and high quality soils may promote human set-
tlements and economic development (Ashraf and Galor, 2011). Settlements may reduce the cost
of collective military action and incite violent conflict (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2014). Similarly,
populated and developed zones may make for attractive targets for attackers (Glaeser and Shapiro,
2002). To account for the possibility that certain zones engender recurring conflict due to favorable
geography, the vector Xi,j controls for a wide range of local geographic features, including latitude,
longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability,
wheat suitability, and malaria risk.13
Finally, ei,j is the error term.
Our main regression analysis reports robust standard errors and p-values. In the Appendix,
we report the p-values obtained according to three alternative treatments of standard errors as
robustness checks. Table A.14 reports standard errors that allow for general forms of spatial auto-
correlation of the error term (Conley, 1999) for six different cutoff distances between 250 and 1,500
kilometers.14 Table A.15 reports (1) standard errors robust to clustering at the state level and (2)
tests of β using the wild cluster bootstrap at the state level (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2008)
based on 9,999 replications. The main results remain significant for both Conley spatial standard
errors and cluster-robust standard errors, and just miss statistical significance for the wild cluster
bootstrap procedure.15
13We compute latitude and longitude by identifying district centroids using a polygon file of district boundaries from
gadm.org. The data for altitude, precipitation, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability, and wheat suitability are taken
from the Food and Agriculture Organization’s Global Agro-Ecological Zones (FAO-GAEZ) (http://www.fao.org/nr/
gaez/en/). They are originally available as raster data. We compute district-level measures by averaging over raster
points within each district. Similarly, we compute ruggedness according to the raster data made available by Nunn
and Puga (2012). We take raster data on land quality from Ramankutty et al. (2002). We take the raster index for the
stability of malaria transmission from Kiszewski et al. (2004).
14Here we make use of the statistical package acreg in Colella et al. (2019).
15To further account for the possibility that spatial correlation leads to standard errors that are too small (Kelly, 2019), we
generate artificial spatially-correlated noise placebo variables to replace our variable of interest, reallocating conflict
exposure randomly across districts within a state (without replacement). The Moran’s I statistic for the full specification
with state fixed effects and controls is 0.044, indicating spatial autocorrelation in the regression residuals (Appendix
Table A.15). However, the placebo variables nearly always fail to produce treatment effects as large as those of our main
coefficient estimates (Appendix Figure A.9).
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Table 1: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: Main Results
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure 3.713∗∗∗ 1.601∗∗∗ 1.465∗∗∗
(0.305) (0.380) (0.370)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Population density Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No Yes
Standardized beta coefficient 0.240 0.104 0.095
R2 0.598 0.829 0.849
Observations 660 660 660
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is district. Dependent variable is ln(0.01 + Luminosity) averaged
between 1992-2010. Variable of interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles between 1000-1757 with a
cutoff distance of 250 kilometers. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipita-
tion, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability, wheat suitability, and malaria risk. Population density is
ln(PopulationDensity) in 1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses, followed by p-values in brackets. ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2 display the summary statistics for the variables in our regression
analysis.
5.2 Main Results
Table 1 shows the main results for the relationship between pre-colonial conflict exposure and cur-
rent economic development across Indian districts. In column 1, we report the result for the bi-
variate correlation after controlling for log population density. The (unstandardized) coefficient
estimate for Con f lictExposurei,j is 3.713, and is significant at the 1 percent level. Column 2 adds
state fixed effects. The coefficient estimate falls to 1.601, but remains significant. In column 3, we
add the controls for local geography. The coefficient estimate is similar in size and significance to
the previous specification.16
Overall, the Table 1 results support the main “reduced-form” prediction of our theoretical frame-
work. Namely, there is a positive and significant relationship between local exposure to pre-colonial
conflicts and levels of economic development in India today. The coefficient estimate in column
3 indicates that a one standard deviation increase in pre-colonial conflict exposure predicts a 0.10
standard-deviation increase in current luminosity levels. This magnitude is similar in size to the ef-
fect of pre-colonial political centralization on current luminosity levels in Africa found by Michalopou-
los and Papaioannou (2013, 130), who report a standardized beta coefficient of 0.12. It is also
16Local geographic features may influence long-run development patterns in non-linear ways. To help account for this
possibility, we include the quadratic term for each such control. The main results remain robust (not shown to save
space).
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broadly similar in magnitude to the finding by Banerjee and Iyer (2005, 1203) in their study of
the relationship between districts in British India under a non-landlord revenue system and post-
colonial agricultural productivity, for which one can compute a standardized beta coefficient of
0.14.
6 Robustness
In this section, we report our main robustness checks. First, we perform an instrumental variables
analysis that exploits variation in pre-colonial conflict exposure driven by the cost distance to the
Khyber Pass, the principal historical route of Central Asian invaders into India. Second, we show
robustness to additional control variables, including: (1) initial state capacity; (2) additional geo-
graphic features; (3) colonial institutions; (4) ethnic and religious fractionalization; and (5) post-
1757 conflict. Third, we show robustness to alternative ways of operationalizing local exposure to
pre-colonial interstate military competition that take into account faraway conflicts by exploiting
information about the pre-colonial states that participated in them.
6.1 Instrumental Variables
6.1.1 Historical Information
To instrument for pre-colonial conflict exposure, we construct a measure of each district’s prox-
imity to the Khyber Pass. The South Asian subcontinent is naturally protected from invasion by
several mountain ranges, including the Himalayas, Hindu Kush, Spin Ghar, and Arakans. Histori-
cally, the Khyber Pass was the main route for invaders coming from Central Asia to India (Docherty,
2008). Thus, proximity to the Khyber Pass can be treated as a forcing variable that affects a district’s
exposure to pre-colonial conflict.
Numerous invaders from Central Asia have either come through the Khyber Pass or have sought
to control it (Docherty, 2008). Mahmud of Ghazni, ruler of the Ghaznavid Empire, appears as a
participant in the first conflict on our database (see Subsection 4.1). Mahmud’s invasions of India
began in 1001, including clashes with the Shahi Kingdom, along with the trading centers of Mul-
tan and Bathinda. Muhammad of Ghor, Sultan of the Ghurid Empire, invaded Multan in 1175. His
former slave, Qutb al-Din Aibak, was the first of the Delhi Sultans. Following the death of Genghis
Khan, the Delhi Sultinate faced repeated raids from the Chagatai Khanate. Babur’s victory at Pani-
pat in 1526 marked the establishment of the Mughal Empire. The Persian ruler Nadir Shah made
several attacks on the Mughal Empire, notably entering Delhi in 1739. The Durrani ruler Ahmad
Shah Durrani attacked the Mughals repeatedly between 1748 and 1767, via the Khyber Pass. After
the fall of the Mughal Empire, Indian rulers such as Ranjit Singh sought to control the Khyber Pass
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Figure 3: Cost Distance from Khyber Pass by Indian Districts
Notes. This figure shows the average cost distance of each district in India from the Khyber Pass, where we assume that
the cost of crossing a grid cell is proportional to its squared ruggedness. Districts are shaded by decile: districts in the
top decile receive the darkest shade.
to defend against invasions from Afghanistan.
6.1.2 IV Construction
The proximity of each district in India to the Khyber Pass in terms of simple geodesic distance does
not accurately measure how difficult it was to reach it. Despite their proximity to the Khyber Pass,
mountainous states such as Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttaranchal were less
accessible to invaders than the flatter regions of Punjab, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh. Similarly, the
Aravalli Mountains were a natural barrier in eastern Rajasthan. We therefore base our measure of
proximity on a cost-distance formula.
We construct our measure of cost distance using raster data on ruggedness (O¨zak, 2010). We
define the ruggedness of a cell as the average difference in absolute elevation between that cell and
its eight neighbors (Nunn and Puga, 2012). We assume that the cost of crossing a cell is proportion-
ate to the square of its ruggedness. We compute the least-cost path and associated cost of travel
between each grid cell in India and the Khyber Pass. Our benchmark cost-distance measure to the
Khyber Pass averages over all cells in each district. Figure 3 maps these values.
As distance from the Khyber Pass increases, the relationship between our cost-distance mea-
sure and pre-colonial conflict exposure becomes nonlinear, driven by conflicts such as the Carnatic
Wars that were unrelated to invasions from Central Asia. Hence, we compute the Khyber proximity
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instrument as a dummy for whether a district is in the set of 50 districts that are closest to the Khy-
ber Pass in terms of cost distance. We operationalize our instrument in this way since proximity to
the Khyber Pass should in theory decrease the cost of a treated district’s exposure to threats of inva-
sion from Central Asia. This cost decrease is for reasons external to the district itself – namely, the
specific geography of the territory that lies between it and the Khyber Pass. Appendix Figure A.10
plots this measure, while Appendix Figure A.11 shows that most pre-colonial land battles fought
by invaders from Central Asia actually took place within the region that our instrument would pre-
dict. There is a positive and significant relationship between the Khyber proximity instrument and
current economic development across Indian districts (Appendix Table A.16).
Ahead, we perform a variety of robustness checks for our instrument, which we briefly fore-
shadow here. First, we show robustness to possible violations of the exclusion restriction by (1)
controlling for measures of historical trade and (2) reporting placebo results that consider cost-
distance proximity to other points of entry into South Asia that invaders did not historically rely on.
Second, we use several alternative measures of the cost of crossing a grid cell: linear ruggedness,
squared slope, linear slope, and a Human Mobility Index. Third, we replace our cutoff of the closest
50 districts with a cutoff of the closest d districts, where d ∈ {30, 31, ..., 80}. Finally, we account for
the federally administered tribal areas (FATA) of Pakistan, which may inflate the IV results.
6.1.3 IV Results
Table 2 reports the first-stage and instrumental variables results for the same three specifications
as in Table 1. Our first-stage results suggest that being proximate to the Khyber Pass increases
exposure to conflict by 0.08 to 0.21 units. These magnitudes are roughly comparable to the standard
deviation of our conflict exposure variable of 0.10. The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics are larger than
10, indicating instrument strength and a relatively low propensity for bias at the second stage. The
second-stage coefficient estimates suggest that a one-unit change in conflict exposure increases
luminosity by between 3.5 and 4.9 units. The former estimate is comparable to the first column
of the main results from Table 1, corresponding to a standardized effect size of slightly more than
0.20.
Our IV estimates diminish less than our OLS estimates once we add state fixed effects and the
geographic controls. In columns 2 and 3, they are slightly more than twice as large as their OLS
counterparts. One potential explanation for this difference is downward bias due to omitted vari-
ables in the OLS analysis. Weaker pre-colonial states or those with less capacity for later state-
making may have been located closer to the Khyber Pass. Another possibility concerns potential
differences between compliers and the full sample. Districts exposed to pre-colonial conflict due
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Table 2: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: Instrumental Variables
Panel A: First Stage
Dependent variable: Pre-Colonial Conflict Exposure
(1) (2) (3)
Cost distance to Kyhber Pass 0.206∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.025) (0.024)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Population density Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No Yes
R2 0.429 0.649 0.669
Observations 660 660 660
Panel B: Second Stage
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure 4.930∗∗∗ 4.626∗∗∗ 3.482∗∗
(0.609) (1.291) (1.389)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.012]
Population density Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No Yes
Anderson-Rubin p-value 0.000 0.000 0.012
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic 131.275 14.444 10.693
Observations 660 660 660
Notes. Estimation method is 2SLS. Unit of analysis is district. In Panel A (first stage), dependent variable is pre-colonial
conflict exposure to land battles between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers, while variable of interest
is cost distance to Khyber Pass (computed as squared ruggedness). In Panel B (second stage), dependent variable is
ln(0.01+ Luminosity) averaged between 1992-2010, while variable of interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure between
1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers, as instrumented by cost distance to Khyber Pass. Geographic controls
for both first and second stages include latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice
suitability, wet rice suitability, wheat suitability, and malaria risk. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1750 for
first stage, and in 1990 for second stage. Robust standard errors in parentheses, followed by p-values in brackets. ***, **,
and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
to invasion from Central Asia may have had a stronger state-making response than districts ex-
posed to other pre-colonial conflicts. A third possibility is measurement error. The list of con-
flicts in Jaques (2007) may be incomplete, identification of conflict locations may be inexact, and
the inverse distance-weighting approach may only approximate the true mapping of conflicts into




One potential objection to our IV strategy is that the Khyber Pass introduced South Asia to phe-
nomena beyond conflict exposure that may have been relevant to both pre-colonial state-making
and later economic development. Trade was the most notable such potential factor. In the main
IV analysis, we control for local geographic features that may have influenced historical trade pat-
terns. Similarly, we use state fixed effects to help account for modern differences in trade policy
across state governments. To further account for the role of trade, we now perform two types of
robustness tests.
Controls for Historical Trade
The first robustness check controls for historical trade in several ways. First, we code a district as
having access to a historical trade route if it was intersected by a major trade route or had a major
port according to the historical map in Raychaudhuri (1982, 334). Second, we code a dummy equal
to one for districts containing Silk Road sites in India according to UNESCO.17 Third, we code a
dummy equal to one for districts with a major medieval port according to Jha (2013). Appendix
Table A.17 indicates that the IV results are robust to all three trade controls. Appendix Table A.18
shows that these results also hold for cost-distance constructions of the trade controls.
Placebo Points of Entry
The second robustness check uses alternative points of entry into South Asia that invaders did not
historically rely on as placebos. The placebo points of entry are Surat, Kodungallur, Goa, Calicut,
and Bombay. For each of them, we compute an analogous cost-distance measure as used to com-
pute cost distance from the Khyber Pass. We then code a placebo “instrument” equal to one for
the 50 districts closest to each entry point in cost-distance terms. Appendix Table A.19 shows that
these cost distances generally fail to predict conflict exposure. In the IV specifications, the placebo
points of entry cannot generally be used to infer a positive effect of conflict exposure on modern
economic development. The exception is Bombay, with a weak first stage F-statistic of less than
four.
6.1.5 Additional IV Robustness
Alternative Cost Distance
In addition, we show that the specific construction of our instrument does not drive our IV results.
Rather than relying on the squared ruggedness of a grid cell as a measure of the cost of crossing
17Available at: https://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/5492/.
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that cell, we try four alternatives. They are: linear slope; squared slope; linear ruggedness; and
a human mobility index (HMI). The final measure is based on the speed that a military infantry
unit can maintain while walking over different terrain types (O¨zak, 2018). For the first three of
these alternatives, we use the same “closest 50 districts” cutoff as in our baseline. For the HMI cost
measure, we expand this cutoff to the closest 100 districts. The HMI assigns a relatively low cost of
accessing the mountainous regions of Jammu and Kashmir from the Khyber Pass, even compared
to the Punjab and western Uttar Pradesh, and so does not become a robust predictor of conflict
exposure unless a larger proximity cutoff is used. Appendix Table A.20 shows that these alternative
measures of computing cost distance give results similar to the main IV results.
Alternative Cutoff Values
We also show that using a specific cutoff value of 50 districts does not drive the main IV results.
Appendix Figure A.12 depicts how the coefficient estimate and 95 percent confidence interval on
our main conflict exposure measure changes as we vary this cutoff value between 30 and 80. As
the figure makes clear, the coefficient estimates are relatively stable throughout the range of cutoff
values, and are statistically significant at the 5 percent level for the range of cutoffs from 36 through
57.
FATA Region of Pakistan
Another potential objection is that excluding the federally administered tribal areas (FATA) of Pak-
istan inflates our IV results, since this region is near the Khyber Pass and experienced pre-colonial
conflicts (Appendix Figure A.1), yet remains underdeveloped today. First, the main OLS results are
robust to the inclusion of districts in Bangladesh and Pakistan, the two other main components of
the British Raj apart from modern-day India (Appendix Table A.21). Second, Appendix Table A.22
indicates that the IV results continue to hold if we include Bangladesh and Pakistan. Thus, our IV
results do not depend on the FATA region.
6.2 Additional Control Variables
6.2.1 Initial Conditions
To account for the possibility that certain zones engender recurring conflict due to favorable geog-
raphy and/or other initial conditions, we have taken several actions. First, we have restricted our
analysis to within-state variation by including state fixed effects. Second, we have controlled for a
range of local geographic features. Third, we have performed an instrumental variables analysis.
To further test for this possibility, we now perform two additional types of robustness checks.
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Initial State Capacity
In Appendix Table A.23, we control for initial state capacity by district in multiple ways. First, we
georeference and count the number of Indian settlements during the Neolithic and Chalcolithic
Ages, respectively, according to Nag (2007, 4, 6). Second, we georeference and count the number of
important Indian cultural sites between 300-700 CE and the eighth through twelfth centuries from
Schwartzberg (1978, 28, 34). Third, we control for the natural logarithm of (one plus) the total urban
population in the year 1000 according to Chandler (1987). Finally, we georeference and count the
presence of a major Indian state between the tenth through eleventh or eleventh through twelfth
centuries based on Nag (2007, 28, 30), or in 1525 based on Joppen (1907). The coefficient estimates
for Con f lictExposurei,j remain robust.18
Additional Geographic Controls
In Appendix Table A.24, we repeat the main analysis after taking into account several additional
local geographic controls beyond those included in the baseline specification (i.e., latitude, longi-
tude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability, wheat
suitability, and malaria risk). They include the natural logarithm of (one plus) the distance to near-
est coast, the natural logarithm of (one plus) the distance to nearest foreign border, river presence,
irrigation potential, rainfall variation, and the natural logarithm of (one plus) the distance to the
nearest resource deposits (i.e., diamonds, gems, gold, petroleum).19 Columns 1 to 6 add each ad-
ditional geographic control independently, while column 7 adds all them together. The coefficient
estimate for Con f lictExposurei,j remains significant across each specification.20
6.2.2 Colonial Institutions
As described in Section 1, one strand of the literature highlights the colonial origins of contempo-
rary economic development in India. Drawing on this literature, we control for the potential role of
18As another way to control for past development, we include a measure of colonial real wages between 1873-1906 at the
nearest market according to data from Fenske and Kala (2017). The main results continue to hold (not shown to save
space).
19We compute the natural logarithm of (one plus) distance from each district to the coast. We compute each district’s
distance from the border as the minimum of its distances from Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, China, Nepal, and Pak-
istan. As with distance from the coast, we then take the natural logarithm of one plus this distance. We report a “river”
dummy that captures whether a district is intersected by one of the major rivers as reported in the Natural Earth Data
(https://www.naturalearthdata.com/). The main results continue to hold (not shown to save space). We compute
each district’s irrigation potential using data from Bentzen, Kaarsen and Wingender (2017). To account for the preva-
lence of drought, we control for the mean and coefficient of variation of rainfall as reported by Matsuura and Willmott
(2009). Using data from Tollefsen, Strand and Buhaug (2012), we control for the natural logarithm of (one plus) dis-
tances from the district centroid to deposits of diamonds, gems, gold, and petroleum.
20Additionally, we compute distance to a presidency city as the minimum of the distance from a district’s centroid to
Bombay, Calcutta, or Madras. As an alternative, we compute the minimum of this value and distance from Delhi. The
main results are robust (not shown to save space).
24
colonial institutions in two ways. First, following Iyer (2010), we include a dummy variable for di-
rect British rule. Second, following Banerjee and Iyer (2005), we control for the proportion of each
district in British India that was under a non-landlord revenue system.
Appendix Table A.25 presents the results. To establish a baseline coefficient value, we first re-
run the main specification for the sub-sample for which the direct rule variable is available in col-
umn 1. The coefficient estimate for Con f lictExposurei,j is 1.263, and is significant at the 1 per-
cent level. We then add the direct rule measure as a control in column 2. The coefficient estimate
for Con f lictExposurei,j is very similar in size and significance to the previous specification.21 In
columns 3 and 4, we repeat this exercise for the non-landlord control. Once more, the coefficient
estimates for Con f lictExposurei,j are positive and significant.
Overall, these tests suggest that pre-colonial history – and in particular conflict exposure – sig-
nificantly predicts current local development in India above and beyond the role of colonial insti-
tutions.
6.2.3 Fractionalization
Another strand of the literature emphasizes the role of inter-ethnic and religious relations in India.
In Appendix Table A.26, we control for such factors in multiple ways. Column 1 includes a dummy
variable for districts that had major medieval ports, which according to Jha (2013) were traditionally
zones of ethnic tolerance. Alternatively, we account for the duration of medieval Muslim rule in
each district in column 2, taking data from Jha (2013). Column 3 controls for the current share of
each district that is Muslim, while column 4 controls for current religious polarization levels.22 In
the next two columns, we account for current local linguistic and religious fractionalization levels,
respectively.23 Finally, in column 7 we control for whether a district is intersected by the Ganges
River, which according to Hindu sacred geography is linked with the presence of upper castes (Jha,
2013, 815). The coefficient estimates for Con f lictExposurei,j remain positive and significant across
all seven specifications. These robustness checks imply that inter-ethnic and religious relations do
not confound our main results.
21For robustness, we re-ran this specification after hand-coding the direct rule variable for the missing 30-odd observa-
tions. The coefficient estimate for Con f lictExposurei,j remains very similar to the main result in column 3 of Table 1
(not shown to save space).
22We take the religion share data from the Indian Census (https://censusindia.gov.in/), and compute polarization
levels according to the method in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).




To account for the potential role of post-1757 conflict exposure, we compute our benchmark mea-
sure of conflict exposure for the colonial and post-colonial eras. Here, we divide British colonial
rule into two distinct sub-periods, 1758-1839 and 1840-1946, with the cutoff marked by the emer-
gence of British military and political dominance over the Indian subcontinent in the 1840s (Clod-
felter, 2002, 244-50).24
Appendix Table A.27 includes controls for colonial conflict exposure between 1758 and 1839
(column 1) and between 1840 and 1946 (column 2), and post-colonial conflict exposure between
1947 and 2010 (column 3). In column 4, we include all three controls together. The coefficient es-
timates for Con f lictExposurei,j are always significant, with values between 1.461 and 1.492. These
results suggest that local exposure to colonial and post-colonial conflicts do not diminish the pre-
dictive importance of pre-colonial conflict exposure. Colonial conflict exposure between 1840 and
1946 predicts significantly lower local development levels in India today, although the magnitude
of this coefficient estimate is less than half the size of the main estimate. Nonetheless, this result
suggests that the nature of post-1840 colonial warfare was different from pre-colonial warfare.
6.3 Alternative Measures of Conflict Exposure
As described in Subsection 4.1.2, we view the benchmark conflict exposure measure as the most
straightforward way to measure the local extent of interstate military competition. Still, our bench-
mark measure may overlook conflicts that were fought at a large distance from a pre-colonial state’s
political center, but nonetheless prompted institutional reforms there. To address this possibility,
we produce a set of alternative conflict exposure measures. Here, we code each major state partic-
ipant in our pre-colonial conflict database, and identify its capital city.
In our first alternative measure, we calculate the number of conflicts in which each pre-colonial
state participated, and assign these conflicts to the district in which the state was headquartered.
In this manner, conflicts are counted for the districts that headquartered each pre-colonial state
that participated in them, regardless of how far away they were actually fought.
As a second way to include a pre-colonial state’s participation in faraway conflicts, we compute
conflict exposure using Equation 1, but replace the locations of the conflicts with those of the capi-
tals of the pre-colonial states that participated in them. For a conflict with three actors, for example,
this measure treats the conflict as if it is three events.
24Alternatively, we may identify 1857 as the cutoff year for the two sub-periods of British colonial rule. This year marked
the start of the Sepoy Mutiny (1857-9), along with rule by the British Crown (versus the East India Company). All the
results described in Appendix Table A.27 remain similar in terms of sign and significance for this alternative cutoff (not
shown to save space).
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As another way to apportion pre-colonial conflicts across state participants, we mimic Ko¨nig
et al. (2017) and compute the convex hull for each participant according to the geographical coor-
dinates of the conflicts that participant took part in. We treat all districts that intersect this convex
hull as affected by a conflict, whether directly in battle or by troops on the march between bat-
tlefield locations. For each affected district, we calculate the number of conflicts. To illustrate
this approach, Appendix Figure A.13 plots the convex hull for pre-colonial conflicts involving the
seventeenth-century Mughal ruler Shah Jahan.
As a final way to include a pre-colonial state’s participation in faraway conflicts, regardless of
conflict location, we compute the convex hull for each broad cluster of conflicts as categorized by
Jaques (e.g., “Later Mughal-Maratha Wars”). We treat all districts that intersect this convex hull
as affected by this group of conflicts. Next, we compute the number of conflicts for each affected
district.
The five conflict exposure measures described above (i.e., the benchmark measure plus the four
alternatives) are highly correlated, suggesting that our empirical results are not contingent upon
the choice of any specific measure. Still, in Appendix Table A.28, we re-run the regression analysis
for these alternative measures of pre-colonial conflict exposure. Our main results remain robust.
7 Channels
The results in Sections 5 and 6 provide support for the main “reduced-form” prediction of our argu-
ment, namely that the relationship between pre-colonial conflict exposure and current economic
development levels in India is positive and significant. Drawing on our theoretical framework from
Section 2, we now analyze the different channels through which pre-colonial warfare may have
influenced long-run development.
To review, we have argued that reductions in local levels of violence and greater investments
in physical capital were at least in part functions of more powerful local government institutions.
In line with this argument, our framework produces three predictions that reflect the channels
through which the main “reduced-form” result may have operated. First, greater pre-colonial con-
flict exposure should be associated with pre-colonial and colonial-era state-making. Second, there
should be a negative and significant relationship between pre-colonial conflict exposure and (even-
tual) political violence levels. Finally, there should be a positive and significant relationship be-
tween pre-colonial conflict exposure and subsequent investments in physical capital such as ir-
rigation infrastructure that depend on a less violent domestic environment. In this section, we
evaluate each channel one at a time.
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7.1 Pre-Colonial and Colonial-Era State-Making
We begin the channels analysis by testing the link from pre-colonial conflict exposure to early state-
making efforts.
We measure pre-colonial state-making outcomes in two ways. The first is the number of im-
portant Mughal sites reported by Schwartzberg (1978). In particular, we georeference plate VI.A.4,
“Religious and Cultural Sites of the Mughal Period, 1526-1707” and count the number of sites within
each modern district. These sites include a range of public works such as bridges, forts, and palaces.
To the extent that public works depend on the state’s ability to extract resources from local popula-
tions, this variable proxies for pre-colonial state capacity, even if imperfect, given the general lack
of available data. Second, we use maps of the Mughal Empire digitized by Jha (2013) to identify dis-
tricts incorporated by the rulers Babur, Akbar, and Aurangzeb, respectively. Following others in the
literature (e.g., Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman, 2002; Heldring, 2018) we interpret the longevity
of pre-colonial state history as a measure of early state strength.
In Table 3, we regress our measures of pre-colonial state-making on pre-colonial conflict expo-
sure. Column 1 indicates that there is a positive and significant relationship between pre-colonial
conflict exposure and important Mughal sites including public works. Columns 2 to 4 take the
longevity of state history as the outcome variable, which we operationalize in terms of districts
incorporated into the Mughal Empire by Babur, Akbar, and Aurangzeb. There is a positive and sig-
nificant relationship between pre-colonial conflict exposure and early state capacity under both
Babur and Akbar (the relationship for Aurangzeb remains positive, but not statistically significant).
To complement the above analysis, we construct colonial fiscal data for the late nineteenth cen-
tury according to Baness (1881), a secondary archival source. This book contains information on
the land tax revenue, physical size, and population for several hundred historical Indian adminis-
trative units under direct or indirect British rule. Here, indirect rule refers to major Princely states.25
To match historical states to modern districts, we rely on the information on provincial and state
names in Baness’ book.26 To supplement the late nineteenth-century fiscal data, we rely on the
1931 land tax revenue data for districts in British India from Lee (2018).
Table 4 regresses our measures of colonial fiscal development on pre-colonial conflict expo-
sure. In columns 1 to 6, we take the available land tax revenue in 1881 as our dependent variable.
25Following Iyer (2010, 695), we focus on Princely states that received British ceremonial gun salutes. We identify gun
salute status in the late nineteenth century according to the main text of Chakrabarti (1896).
26We compute conflict exposure here in terms of the distance from the capital city as recorded by Baness or approximate
centroid (if capital city information was not available) of each historical state to each conflict location, and then match
them to modern districts.
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Table 3: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Pre-Colonial-Era State-Making
Dependent variable: Important Mughal Sites State History
Babur Akbar Aurangzeb
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (benchmark) 0.954∗
(0.497)
[0.056]
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (1000-1526) 0.513∗∗
(0.229)
[0.025]
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (1000-1556) 0.723∗∗∗
(0.262)
[0.006]
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (1000-1658) -0.080
(0.173)
[0.642]
Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standardized beta coefficient 0.199 0.041 0.068 -0.012
R2 0.122 0.768 0.715 0.718
Observations 659 659 659 659
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is district. Dependent variable in column 1 is number of important
Mughal-era sites including public works. Dependent variables in columns 2-4 are state longevity in terms of districts
incorporated into the Mughal Empire by Babur (1526-30), Akbar (1556-1605), and Aurangzeb (1658-1707). Variable of
interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers. It spans 1000-1757 in
column 1, 1000-1526 in column 2, 1000-1556 in column 3, and 1000-1658 in column 4. Geographic controls include lati-
tude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability, wheat suitability,
and malaria risk. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1500. Robust standard errors in parentheses, followed
by p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
We scale these data in two different ways, by area and by persons. Furthermore, we divide them
up by British direct rule or indirect rule (i.e., Princely states). There is a positive and significant
relationship between pre-colonial conflict exposure and colonial fiscal outcomes, particularly for
districts that were under direct British rule. In columns 7 and 8, we take the available land tax rev-
enue for districts in British India in 1931 (scaled by area and by persons) as the outcome variables.
The coefficient estimates for Con f lictExposurei,j remain positive, but do not attain statistical signif-
icance. Given that the number of sample districts for which fiscal data are available differs between
1881 and 1931, we use caution in interpreting the differences between these results. Nevertheless,
when taken together, they suggest that districts that experienced greater pre-colonial conflict ex-
posure were “early movers” in the development of colonial fiscal capacity, but that historical fiscal
differences between them later diminished. We view these results as broadly in line with Lee (2018),
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who highlights the importance of colonial differences in local fiscal capacity in explaining long-run
development in India. Relative to Lee, our results suggest that pre-colonial conflict exposure was a
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Pre-Colonial Conflict versus Colonial and Post-Colonial Conflict
Dependent variable: Colonial Conflict Exposure Colonial Conflict Exposure Post-Colonial Conflict Exposure
1758-1839 1840-1946 1947-2010
Land Battles All Conflicts Land Battles All Conflicts Land Battles All Conflicts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure 0.170∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.040 0.316 -0.025∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.090) (0.039) (0.302) (0.005) (0.007)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.308] [0.295] [0.000] [0.000]
Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standardized beta coefficient 0.350 0.429 0.044 0.206 -0.129 -0.107
R2 0.568 0.571 0.740 0.562 0.816 0.874
Observations 660 660 660 660 660 660
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is district. Dependent variable is colonial conflict exposure to land battles between
1758-1839 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers in column 1 and to all conflict types in column 2. Similarly, it is colonial conflict
exposure between 1840-1946 in columns 3-4 and post-colonial conflict exposure between 1947-2010 in columns 5-6. Variable of interest
is pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers. Geographic controls include
latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability, wheat suitability, and malaria
risk. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses, followed by p-values in brackets. ***,
**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Overall, we view this evidence as consistent with the first prediction described above, namely
that pre-colonial conflict exposure played a significant role in pre-colonial and colonial-era state-
making.
7.2 Political Violence
In line with our theoretical framework, we continue the channels analysis by testing the relation-
ship between pre-colonial conflict exposure and (eventual) political violence levels.
In Table 5, we regress local exposure to colonial and post-colonial conflicts on pre-colonial con-
flict exposure. There is a positive and significant relationship between pre-colonial and colonial
conflict exposure between 1758 and 1839, indicating that districts that experienced greater pre-
colonial conflict exposure continued to experience conflict during the first sub-period of British
colonial rule. This relationship, however, is not significant for the second sub-period of British
colonial rule between 1840 and 1946, and turns negative and significant for the post-colonial era.
Districts that experience more pre-colonial conflict exposure, therefore, experienced significantly
less conflict between 1947 and 2010.
We take two other measures of political violence as outcome variables in Table 6. Column 1 re-
gresses the number of fatalities per district between 2015 and 2018 according to the ACLED Project
on pre-colonial conflict exposure.27 Here, we find a negative and significant relationship between
27Available at: https://www.acleddata.com/.
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Table 6: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Post-Colonial Political Violence
Dependent variable: Political Violence Maoist Control Fractionalization
Linguistic Religious
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure -0.241∗∗ -0.381∗∗ -0.209∗ 0.080
(0.102) (0.163) (0.113) (0.071)
[0.019] [0.020] [0.065] [0.260]
Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standardized beta coefficient -0.119 -0.129 -0.073 0.048
R2 0.408 0.281 0.570 0.557
Observations 660 395 660 660
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is district. Dependent variable in column 1 is Fatalities, defined
as fatalities per district between 2015-18 (in hundreds). Dependent variable in column 2 is MaoistControl, a dummy
variable that equals 1 for Maoist control in 2003. Dependent variable in column 3 is LinguisticFractionalization, de-
fined as 1 minus the Herfindahl index of language population shares in 2001. Dependent variable in column 4 is
ReligiousFractionalization, defined as 1 minus the Herfindahl index of religion population shares in 2001. Variable of
interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers. Ge-
ographic controls include latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet
rice suitability, wheat suitability, and malaria risk. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1990. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, followed by p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%
level.
pre-colonial conflict exposure and contemporary political violence in terms of fatalities. Column
2 regresses local Maoist control in 2003 according to Mukherjee (2017) on pre-colonial conflict ex-
posure. In 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh called the Maoist insurgency “India’s most im-
portant internal security threat” (Mukherjee, 2017, 5). We show that pre-colonial conflict exposure
predicts a significantly lower likelihood of local control by Maoist insurgents.
Overall, we view the above results as consistent with the second prediction described above,
that previous conflict exposure may pave the way for domestic peace in the long term (Morris,
2014, 3-26).28
Finally, in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6, we regress linguistic and religious fractionalization in 2001
on pre-colonial conflict exposure. Pre-colonial conflict predicts significantly less linguistic frac-
tionalization today (there is no statistically significant relationship for religious fractionalization).
This result suggests that a reduction in linguistic heterogeneity – via the homogenizing effects of
historical conquest, for example – may be one long-run outcome of pre-colonial warfare, part and
28According to our theoretical framework, we would not expect to observe the anti-persistence of conflict until a dom-
inant political entity (e.g., the post-1840 British colonial government) was able to establish a widespread monopoly
over violence across India. In the meantime, however, we would expect warfare to persist so long as there was ongoing
interstate military competition in India. During the pre-colonial era, in fact, we find evidence for conflict persistence
from one century to the next (results not shown to save space).
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Table 7: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Irrigation Infrastructure
Dependent variable: %Irrigated
1931 1956-87
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure 41.630∗∗∗ 24.368∗∗ 21.275∗∗ 79.578∗∗∗ 32.442∗∗ 37.413∗∗
(9.751) (11.445) (10.357) (16.702) (15.057) (15.758)
[0.000] [0.034] [0.041] [0.000] [0.032] [0.018]
Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No Yes No No Yes
Standardized beta coefficient 0.380 0.222 0.194 0.368 0.150 0.173
R2 0.166 0.302 0.391 0.334 0.582 0.611
Observations 257 257 257 271 271 271
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is district. Dependent variables are as follows. %Irrigated measures
the proportion of area sown with canal irrigation in 1931 (columns 1-3) and the proportion of gross cropped area that is
irrigated averaged between 1956-87 (columns 4-6). Variable of interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles
between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, altitude,
ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability, wheat suitability, and malaria risk. Pop-
ulation density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1900 in columns 1-3 and in 1950 in columns 4-6. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, followed by p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
parcel with more powerful local government institutions, that helps explain the anti-persistence of
conflict in India which we observe.
7.3 Irrigation Infrastructure
We conclude the channels analysis by testing the relationship between pre-colonial conflict expo-
sure and the subsequent provision of other public goods that depend on a less violent domestic
environment, and in particular those that promote investments in physical capital such as irriga-
tion infrastructure.
We take colonial-era data on irrigation infrastructure at the district level in 1931 from Bharadwaj
and Mirza (2017). We rely on irrigation data for post-colonial India from Banerjee and Iyer (2005),
who provide district-level data across more than 10 major Indian states. Following Banerjee and
Iyer, we average these data between 1956 and 1987.
Table 7 indicates that there is a positive and significant relationship between pre-colonial con-
flict exposure and the proportion of agricultural land within a district that is irrigated across both
the late colonial era (columns 1-3) and the post-colonial one (columns 4-6). We view these results
as consistent with our theoretical framework, namely that those districts that were more exposed
to pre-colonial conflict – and hence may have developed more powerful local government insti-
tutions, and have eventually provided greater domestic security – may have been better placed to
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make local investments in physical capital.
7.4 Section Summary
The results in this section suggest that the positive relationship between pre-colonial conflict ex-
posure and current economic development in India runs through the following channels: (1) pre-
colonial and colonial-era state-making; (2) greater domestic security in the long term; (3) greater
colonial and post-colonial investments in physical capital (i.e., irrigation infrastructure). In line
with our argument, we view reductions in local levels of violence and greater investments in phys-
ical capital as functions – at least in part – of more powerful local government institutions.
8 Conclusion
We have analyzed the role of pre-colonial history – and in particular the role of interstate warfare –
in long-run development outcomes across India. We have argued that, if a given district in India ex-
perienced more pre-colonial warfare, then more powerful local government institutions were likely
to emerge there, which in turn helped promote local long-run economic development through the
greater provision of domestic security and other basic public goods.
To evaluate the predictions of this argument, we have exploited a new geocoded database of
historical interstate conflicts on the Indian subcontinent. We have shown evidence for a positive,
significant, and robust relationship between pre-colonial conflict exposure and local economic de-
velopment in India today. Consistent with our theoretical framework, we have found that local
pre-colonial and colonial-era state-making, and less political violence and higher investments in
physical infrastructure in the long term, help explain this relationship. Our study thus casts new
light on the deep roots of Indian development patterns.
Our study shows that the “military competition” framework applies beyond the paradigmatic
case of Western Europe. This parallel between Western Europe and India makes sense, given that
two key historical factors in the European context – namely, enduring political fragmentation and
interstate military competition – were also important features of the pre-colonial Indian landscape.
In Imperial China, by contrast, there was political centralization and mass rebellion was frequent.
This dynamic altered the consequences of violent conflict for institutional reforms (Dincecco and
Wang, 2018). Furthermore, unlike in pre-colonial Africa, historical population density in pre-colonial
India was high enough – as in Western Europe – to make territorial acquisition through warfare
worthwhile (Herbst, 2000, 13-16). Low population density meant that a traditional goal of African
warfare was to capture slaves (Herbst, 2000, 20), weakening the relationship between warfare and
state-making. There is no significant correlation between warfare and state centralization in the
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context of pre-colonial Africa (Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson, 2013). Moreover, the correlation be-
tween pre-colonial conflict levels and long-run development outcomes in Africa is negative (Besley
and Reynal-Querol, 2014; Dincecco, Fenske and Onorato, 2019). Thus, our study helps clarify the
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Online Appendix for
Pre-Colonial Warfare and Long-Run Development in India
Figure A.1: Conflict Locations, 1000-2010
Notes. This figure shows the location of each recorded military conflict on the Indian subcontinent between 1000-2010.
Figure A.2: Conflict Locations by Sub-Period
(a) 1000-1757 (b) 1758-1839
(c) 1840-1946 (d) 1947-2010
Notes. This figure shows the location of each recorded military conflict on the Indian subcontinent between 1000-2010 by four sub-
periods: (a) pre-colonial (1000-1757); (b) colonial (1758-1839); (c) colonial (1840-1946); and (d) post-colonial (1947-2010).
A1
Figure A.3: Residualized Pre-Colonial Conflict Exposure by Indian Districts
Notes. This figure shows residualized pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250
kilometers by district in India after controlling for ln(PopulationDensity) in 1990. Districts are shaded by quintile, whereby districts in
the top quintile receive the darkest shade.
Figure A.4: Residualized Luminosity by Indian Districts
Notes. This figure shows residualized average luminosity between 1992-2010 by district in India after controlling for
ln(PopulationDensity) in 1990. Districts are shaded by quintile, whereby districts in the top quintile receive the darkest shade.
A2
Figure A.5: Pre-Colonial Conflict Exposure and Luminosity by Indian Districts (Residualized)
Notes. This figure plots residualized pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250
kilometers against residualized average luminosity between 1992-2010 by district in India. Both variables are residualized by controlling
for ln(PopulationDensity) in 1990.
Figure A.6: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: Exclude States One by One
Notes. Each hollow dot represents the point estimate for the regression model in column 3 of Table 1 when we exclude each state or
union territory one by one. Horizontal bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
A3
Figure A.7: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: Exclude Colonial Provinces
Notes. Each hollow dot represents the point estimate for the regression model in column 3 of Table 1 when we exclude each colonial
province one by one. Horizontal bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Figure A.8: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: 95% Confidence Intervals
Notes. Each hollow dot represents the point estimate for the regression model in column 3 of Table 1 when the dependent variable is
ln(0.01+ Luminosity) for each year between 1992-2010. Horizontal bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
A4
Figure A.9: Artificial Spatially-Correlated Noise Placebo Variables
(a) Column 1, Table 1 (b) Column 2, Table 1
(c) Column 3, Table 1
Notes. This figure shows the results of tests that generate artificial spatially-correlated noise placebo variables to replace our variable of
interest, reallocating conflict exposure randomly across districts within a state (without replacement) for each of the regression models
in Table 1.
Figure A.10: Khyber Proximity IV
Notes. This figure shows the values of the Khyber Proximity instrument by district in India.
A5
Figure A.11: Locations of Conflicts Fought By Invaders from Central Asia, 1000-1757
Notes. This figure shows the location of each recorded military conflict fought by invaders from Central Asia on the Indian subcontinent
between 1000-1757.
Figure A.12: Sensitivity of IV Results to Alternative Cutoffs
Notes. Each hollow dot represents the point estimate for the regression model in column 3 of Table 2 for different cutoff values used to
define the instrument. Horizontal bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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Notes. This figure shows the convex hull for all pre-colonial land battles involving the seventeenth-century Mughal ruler Shah Jahan.
Dots indicate specific battle locations. The triangle indicates the convex hull enveloping these battles. Shaded districts are those that
intersect the convex hull.
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics: Main Analysis
Mean Std Dev Min Max N
ln(0.01+luminosity) 0.68 1.49 −4.61 4.14 664
Pre-colonial conflict exposure, 1000-1757 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.60 666
Colonial conflict exposure, 1758-1839 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.31 666
Colonial conflict exposure, 1840-1946 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.54 666
Post-colonial conflict exposure, 1947-2010 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.15 666
Khyber proximity 0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00 660
ln(Population density), 1990 5.47 1.15 −1.44 10.61 665
Latitude 23.38 5.72 7.53 34.53 666
Longitude 81.12 6.39 69.47 96.83 666
Altitude 471.46 702.10 −200.73 4914.91 665
Ruggedness 98518.33 161662.39 0.00 851959.50 666
Precipitation 1370.74 698.71 200.22 4486.95 665
Land quality 0.45 0.29 0.00 0.97 662
Dry rice suitability 629.84 589.89 0.00 1722.67 665
Wet rice suitability 1439.98 797.25 0.00 2826.93 665
Wheat suitability 628.43 574.14 0.00 2914.67 665
Malaria risk 0.10 0.34 0.00 2.81 664
Linguistic fractionalization, 2001 0.46 0.27 0.01 4.21 666
Religious fractionalization, 2001 0.26 0.16 0.01 0.72 666
Political violence, 2015-18 (hundreds of fatalities) 0.06 0.19 0.00 2.32 666
Maoist control, 2003 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 395
ln(Tax/Area), 1881 (All) −1.31 1.09 −4.84 1.17 274
ln(Tax/Area), 1881 (British India) −1.46 1.08 −4.84 1.17 201
ln(Tax/Area), 1881 (Princely states) −0.88 0.99 −3.05 1.06 73
ln(Tax/Person), 1881 (All) 0.30 0.91 −2.90 2.83 279
ln(Tax/Person), 1881 (British India) −0.07 0.72 −2.90 1.86 201
ln(Tax/Person), 1881 (Princely states) 1.26 0.59 −0.21 2.83 78
ln(Tax/Area), 1931 (British India) −0.41 0.93 −4.20 1.39 145
ln(Tax/Person), 1931 (British India) 0.32 0.81 −3.09 2.07 144
% Irrigated, 1931 4.76 9.54 0.00 60.99 257
% Irrigated, 1956-87 24.16 20.18 0.04 99.92 271
Notes. See text for variable descriptions and data sources.
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics: Appendix Analysis
Mean Std Dev Min Max N
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (all) 0.11 0.15 0.00 1.03 666
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (sieges) 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.98 666
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (single-day) 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.55 666
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (multi-day) 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.43 666
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (internal) 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.60 666
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (5,000 km cutoff) 0.21 0.10 0.06 0.71 666
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (1500-1757) 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.53 666
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (plus Clodfelter) 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.60 666
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (plus Clodfelter and Narvane) 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.63 666
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (running end-date) 0.13 0.14 0.00 0.73 377
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (plus Bangladesh and Pakistan) 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.60 763
Pre-colonial conflict exposure
(# conflicts in district of state capital) 0.34 2.48 0.00 49.00 666
Pre-colonial conflict exposure
(by location of participant capitals) 0.14 0.29 0.00 4.20 666
Pre-colonial conflict exposure
(# conflicts in convex hull, by participant) 33.85 27.16 0.00 83.00 666
Pre-colonial conflict exposure
(# conflicts in convex hull, by group) 19.22 16.27 0.00 49.00 666
Ln(GDP per capita) 9.65 0.53 7.30 12.16 512
Ln(1+Luminosity) 0.67 1.54 −6.39 4.14 661
Luminosity (levels) 4.27 6.47 0.00 62.62 664
Luminosity (IHS) 1.66 0.99 0.00 4.83 664
Historical trade route 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 666
Silk Road site 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00 666
Medieval trade port 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 666
Surat proximity (placebo) 0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00 663
Kodungallur proximity (placebo) 0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00 663
Goa proximity (placebo) 0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00 663
Calicut proximity (placebo) 0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00 663
Bombay proximity (placebo) 0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00 663
Khyber proximity (linear slope) 0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00 663
Khyber proximity (squared slope) 0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00 663
Khyber proximity (linear ruggedness) 0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00 663
Khyber proximity (HMI) 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 663
Neolithic settlements 0.36 1.54 0.00 20.00 666
Chalcolithic settlments 0.29 1.38 0.00 19.00 666
Cultural sites (300-700 CE) 0.16 0.48 0.00 4.00 666
Cultural sites (8th-12th centuries) 0.66 1.23 0.00 10.00 666
Ln(1+Urban population in 1000) 0.08 0.96 0.00 11.51 666
Ln(1+Distance to coast) 11.12 4.24 0.00 14.04 666
Ln(1+Distance to border) 10.53 4.62 0.00 14.44 666
River dummy 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 666
Irrigation potential 0.20 0.33 0.00 1.00 657
Rainfall variation 0.23 0.07 0.10 0.53 666
Ln(1+Distance to petroleum) 5.49 0.77 1.78 6.69 666
Ln(1+Distance to diamonds; primary) 6.68 0.59 2.59 7.53 666
Ln(1+Distance to diamonds; secondary) 7.25 0.68 4.50 8.00 666
Ln(1+Distance to gems) 4.96 0.88 1.63 7.04 666
Ln(1+Distance to gold; placer) 6.31 0.71 3.54 7.17 666
Ln(1+Distance to gold; vein) 6.14 0.73 2.79 7.20 666
Ln(1+Distance to gold; surface) 6.75 0.61 3.34 7.39 666
Direct rule (colonial) 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 638
%Non-landlord (colonial) 50.81 42.68 0.00 100.00 166
Duration of Muslim rule 363.78 236.27 0.00 995.00 666
Muslim share 0.13 0.17 0.00 0.99 666
Religious polarization 0.47 0.26 0.02 0.99 666
Ganges River 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 666
Notes. See text for variable descriptions and data sources.
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Table A.3: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: Conflict Types
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (baseline) 1.573∗∗∗
(0.374)
[0.000]
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (sieges) -0.328
(0.289)
[0.257]
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (single-day) 1.326∗∗∗
(0.438)
[0.003]
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (multi-day) 2.208∗∗∗
(0.454)
[0.000]
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (internal) 1.481∗∗∗
(0.368)
[0.000]
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (all) 0.681∗∗∗
(0.250)
[0.007]
Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standardized beta coefficient 0.102 0.074 0.096 0.066
R2 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.847
Observations 660 660 660 660
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is district. Dependent variable is ln(0.01+ Luminosity) averaged between 1992-2010.
Variable of interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers. “Baseline” restricts the
conflict sample to land battles, while “siege” restricts it to sieges. “Single-day” and “multi-day” restrict this sample to land battles which
lasted up to one day or multiple days. “Internal” restricts this sample to land battles internal to India. “All” includes the following conflict
types: land battles, sieges, naval battles, and other conflict events (e.g., mutiny), whether single- or multi-day. Geographic controls
include latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability, wheat suitability,
and malaria risk. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses, followed by p-values in
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table A.4: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: 1500-1757 Conflict Sample
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (1500-1757) 4.469∗∗∗ 1.722∗∗∗ 1.429∗∗∗
(0.443) (0.528) (0.474)
[0.000] [0.001] [0.003]
Population density Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No Yes
Standardized beta coefficient 0.222 0.085 0.071
R2 0.590 0.828 0.847
Observations 660 660 660
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is district. Dependent variable is ln(0.01 + Luminosity) averaged between 1992-
2010. Variable of interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles between 1500-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers.
Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability,
wheat suitability, and malaria risk. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses, followed
by p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Table A.5: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: Alternative Conflict Data
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (plus Clodfelter) 1.483∗∗∗
(0.369)
[0.000]
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (plus Clodfelter and Narvane) 1.227∗∗∗
(0.357)
[0.001]
Population density Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes
Standardized beta coefficient 0.096 0.082
R2 0.849 0.848
Observations 660 660
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is district. Dependent variable is ln(0.01+ Luminosity) averaged between 1992-2010.
Variable of interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers. Column
1 adds any conflicts from Clodfelter (2002) that do not already appear in the baseline conflict database (i.e., Jaques, 2007), while column
2 adds non-overlapping conflicts from both Clodfelter (2002) and Narvane (1996). Geographic controls include latitude, longitude,
altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability, wheat suitability, and malaria risk. Population
density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses, followed by p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table A.6: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: Grid Cell Fixed Effects
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure 3.713∗∗∗ 1.875∗∗∗ 1.871∗∗∗
(0.305) (0.524) (0.390)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Population density Yes Yes Yes
Grid cell FE No Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No Yes
Standardized beta coefficient 0.240 0.121 0.121
R2 0.598 0.777 0.814
Observations 660 660 660
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is district. Grid cell fixed effects are 4◦ latitude× 4◦ longitude. Dependent variable is
ln(0.01+ Luminosity) averaged between 1992-2010. Variable of interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles between 1000-
1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land
quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability, wheat suitability, and malaria risk. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1990.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, followed by p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and
10% level.
Table A.7: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: Alternative Cutoff Distance
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (5,000 km cutoff) 4.080∗∗∗ 1.536∗∗∗ 1.378∗∗∗
(0.315) (0.404) (0.395)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Population density Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No Yes
Standardized beta coefficient 0.278 0.105 0.094
R2 0.615 0.828 0.848
Observations 660 660 660
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is district. Dependent variable is ln(0.01 + Luminosity) averaged between 1992-
2010. Variable of interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 5,000 kilometers.
Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability,
wheat suitability, and malaria risk. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses, followed
by p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
A12
Table A.8: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: Running End-Date Cutoff
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure (running end-date) 3.289∗∗∗ 1.247∗∗∗ 1.081∗∗∗
(0.245) (0.265) (0.310)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Population density Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No Yes
Standardized beta coefficient 0.392 0.149 0.129
R2 0.480 0.814 0.825
Observations 377 377 377
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is district. Dependent variable is ln(0.01 + Luminosity) averaged between 1992-
2010. Variable of interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles between 1000-1757 with variable end-date cutoff that includes
exposure to conflicts that took place after 1757 but prior to British conquest of a district. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude,
altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability, wheat suitability, and malaria risk. Population
density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses, followed by p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Table A.9: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: GDP Outcome
Dependent variable: Ln(GDP per Capita)
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure 1.782∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗ 0.448∗
(0.300) (0.255) (0.230)
[0.000] [0.036] [0.052]
Population density Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No Yes
Standardized beta coefficient 0.339 0.102 0.085
R2 0.111 0.687 0.732
Observations 512 512 512
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is district. Dependent variable is ln(GDPperCapita) averaged between 1999-2007.
Variable of interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers. Ge-
ographic controls include latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability,
wheat suitability, and malaria risk. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses, followed
by p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table A.10: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: Unit of Analysis: Grid Cell
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure 2.617∗∗∗ 1.634∗∗∗ 1.749∗∗∗
(0.563) (0.552) (0.521)
[0.000] [0.003] [0.001]
Population density Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No Yes
Standardized beta coefficient 0.128 0.080 0.086
R2 0.700 0.877 0.900
Observations 276 276 276
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is grid cell (1◦ latitude × 1◦ longitude). Dependent variable is ln(0.01+ Luminosity)
averaged between 1992-2010. Variable of interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles between 1000-1757 with a cutoff
distance of 250 kilometers. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice
suitability, wet rice suitability, wheat suitability, and malaria risk. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1990. Robust standard




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.12: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: No Population Density Control
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure 7.104∗∗∗ 4.248∗∗∗ 2.815∗∗∗
(0.514) (0.615) (0.475)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Population density No No No
State FE No Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No Yes
Standardized beta coefficient 0.459 0.275 0.182
R2 0.211 0.627 0.736
Observations 660 660 660
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is district. Dependent variable is ln(0.01 + Luminosity) averaged between 1992-
2010. Variable of interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers.
Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability,
wheat suitability, and malaria risk. Robust standard errors in parentheses, followed by p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Table A.13: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: Historical Population Density Control
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure 4.812∗∗∗ 3.348∗∗∗ 2.544∗∗∗
(0.409) (0.596) (0.491)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Population density Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No Yes
Standardized beta coefficient 0.311 0.216 0.164
R2 0.384 0.659 0.740
Observations 661 661 661
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is district. Dependent variable is ln(0.01 + Luminosity) averaged between 1992-
2010. Variable of interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers.
Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability,
wheat suitability, and malaria risk. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1000. Robust standard errors in parentheses, followed
by p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table A.14: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: Conley Spatial Standard Errors
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure 1.465∗∗∗ 1.465∗∗ 1.465∗∗∗ 1.465∗∗∗ 1.465∗∗∗ 1.465∗∗∗
(0.527) (0.587) (0.542) (0.543) (0.317) (0.412)
[0.005] [0.013] [0.007] [0.007] [0.000] [0.000]
Cutoff distance (km) 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500
Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standardized beta coefficient 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095
R2 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.849
Observations 660 660 660 660 660 660
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is district. Dependent variable is ln(0.01 + Luminosity) averaged between 1992-
2010. Variable of interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers.
Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability,
wheat suitability, and malaria risk. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1990. We report spatial standard errors that allow
for general forms of spatial autocorrelation of the error term (Conley, 1999) for six different cutoff distances between 250 and 1,500
kilometers.
Table A.15: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: Alternative Standard Errors
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure 3.713 1.601 1.465
Population density Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No No
Standardized beta coefficient 0.240 0.104 0.095
State clustered p-value 0.012 0.038 0.034
Wild clustered bootstrap p-value 0.007 0.139 0.129
Moran’s I statistic 0.508 0.070 0.044
R2 0.598 0.829 0.849
Observations 660 660 660
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is district. Dependent variable is ln(0.01 + Luminosity) averaged between 1992-
2010. Variable of interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers.
Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability,
wheat suitability, and malaria risk. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1990. We report the p-values for the coefficient
estimates of the variable of interest for robust standard errors clustered by state and the wild cluster bootstrap procedure. The p-values
for the wild cluster bootstrap procedure use 9,999 replications. Additionally, we report the Moran’s I statistics.
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Table A.16: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: IV: Reduced Form
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3)
Cost distance to Kyhber Pass 1.006∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗
(0.094) (0.090) (0.114)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.015]
Population density Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No Yes
Standardized beta coefficient 0.179 0.077 0.049
R2 0.578 0.827 0.846
Observations 660 660 660
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is district. Dependent variable is ln(0.01+ Luminosity) averaged between 1992-2010.
Variable of interest is cost distance to Khyber Pass. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation,
land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability, wheat suitability, and malaria risk. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in
1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses, followed by p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10% level.
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Table A.17: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: IV: Trade Controls
Panel A: First Stage
Dependent variable: Pre-Colonial Conflict Exposure
(1) (2) (3)
Cost distance to Kyhber Pass 0.078∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Historical trade route Yes No No
Silk Road site No Yes No
Medieval trade port No No Yes
Population density Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.685 0.670 0.673
Observations 660 660 660
Panel B: Second Stage
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure 3.534∗∗ 3.465∗∗ 3.483∗∗
(1.412) (1.388) (1.392)
[0.012] [0.013] [0.012]
Historical trade route Yes No No
Silk Road site No Yes No
Medieval trade port No No Yes
Population density Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Anderson-Rubin p-value 0.012 0.012 0.012
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic 10.376 10.572 10.654
Observations 660 660 660
Notes. Estimation method is 2SLS. Unit of analysis is district. In Panel A (first stage), dependent variable is pre-colonial conflict exposure
to land battles between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers, while variable of interest is cost distance to Khyber Pass.
In Panel B (second stage), dependent variable is ln(0.01+ Luminosity) averaged between 1992-2010, while variable of interest is pre-
colonial conflict exposure between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers, as instrumented by cost distance to Khyber Pass.
HistoricalTradeRoute is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the presence of a major historical trade route or major port according to
UNESCO. SilkRoad is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the presence of a Silk Road site. MedievalPort is a dummy variable that equals 1
for the presence of a major medieval port according to Jha (2013). Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness,
precipitation, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability, wheat suitability, and malaria risk. All previous controls are for both
first and second stages. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1750 for first stage, and in 1990 for second stage. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, followed by p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table A.18: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: IV: Trade Controls (Cost Distance)
Panel A: First Stage
Dependent variable: Pre-Colonial Conflict Exposure
(1) (2) (3)
Cost distance to Kyhber Pass 0.079∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Historical trade route (cost distance) Yes No No
Silk Road site (cost distance) No Yes No
Medieval trade port (cost distance) No No Yes
Population density Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.672 0.672 0.672
Observations 660 660 660
Panel B: Second Stage
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure 3.413∗∗ 3.451∗∗ 3.411∗∗
(1.393) (1.396) (1.393)
[0.014] [0.013] [0.014]
Historical trade route (cost distance) Yes No No
Silk Road site (cost distance) No Yes No
Medieval trade port (cost distance) No No Yes
Population density Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Anderson-Rubin p-value 0.014 0.013 0.014
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic 10.377 10.439 10.379
Observations 660 660 660
Notes. Estimation method is 2SLS. Unit of analysis is district. In Panel A (first stage), dependent variable is pre-colonial conflict ex-
posure to land battles between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers, while variable of interest is cost distance to Khyber
Pass. In Panel B (second stage), dependent variable is ln(0.01+ Luminosity) averaged between 1992-2010, while variable of interest is
pre-colonial conflict exposure between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers, as instrumented by cost distance to Khyber
Pass. HistoricalTradeRoute is cost distance to the nearest major historical trade route or major port according to UNESCO. SilkRoad is
cost distance to nearest Silk Road site. MedievalPort is cost distance to nearest major medieval port according to Jha (2013). Geographic
controls include latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability, wheat suit-
ability, and malaria risk. All previous controls are for both first and second stages. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1750
for first stage, and in 1990 for second stage. Robust standard errors in parentheses, followed by p-values in brackets. ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table A.19: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: IV: Placebo Entry Points
Panel A: First Stage
Dependent variable: Pre-Colonial Conflict Exposure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cost distance to placebo entry point -0.041∗ -0.002 0.007 -0.000 -0.047∗∗
(0.025) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.024)
[0.097] [0.853] [0.462] [1.000] [0.049]
Placebo entry point Surat Kodungallur Goa Calicut Bombay
Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.656 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.657
Observations 660 660 660 660 660
Panel B: Second Stage
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure 7.315 34.071 -18.723 -113.599 7.994∗
(5.554) (173.545) (15.519) (1925.976) (4.715)
[0.188] [0.844] [0.228] [0.953] [0.090]
Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Anderson-Rubin p-value 0.073 0.287 0.002 0.294 0.018
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic 2.380 0.036 1.523 0.003 3.508
Observations 660 660 660 660 660
Notes. Estimation method is 2SLS. Unit of analysis is district. In Panel A (first stage), dependent variable is pre-colonial conflict expo-
sure to land battles between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers, while variable of interest is cost distance to placebo
entry point (i.e., Surat, Kodungallur, Goa, Calicut, and Bombay). In Panel B (second stage), dependent variable is ln(0.01+ Luminosity)
averaged between 1992-2010, while variable of interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250
kilometers, as instrumented by cost distance to placebo entry point. Geographic controls for both first and second stages include lat-
itude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability, wheat suitability, and malaria
risk. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1750 for first stage, and in 1990 for second stage. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses, followed by p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table A.20: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: IV: Alternative Cost Distance
Panel A: First Stage
Dependent variable: Pre-Colonial Conflict Exposure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cost distance to Khyber Pass (alternative) 0.089∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
[0.000] [0.015] [0.000] [0.000]
Alternative cost distance Linear slope Squared slope Linear ruggedness HMI
Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.668 0.661 0.678 0.667
Observations 660 660 660 660
Panel B: Second Stage
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure 5.232∗∗∗ 3.106∗ 5.042∗∗∗ 6.208∗∗∗
(1.668) (1.872) (1.284) (1.750)
[0.002] [0.097] [0.000] [0.000]
Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Anderson-Rubin p-value 0.001 0.114 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic 14.646 5.415 20.938 10.483
Observations 660 660 660 660
Notes. Estimation method is 2SLS. Unit of analysis is district. In Panel A (first stage), dependent variable is pre-colonial conflict exposure
to land battles between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers, while variable of interest is alternative cost distance to
Khyber Pass. In Panel B (second stage), dependent variable is ln(0.01 + Luminosity) averaged between 1992-2010, while variable of
interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers, as instrumented by alternative
cost distance to Khyber Pass. In column 1, alternative cost distance is computed as linear slope. In column 2, it is computed as squared
slope. In column 3, it is computed as linear ruggedness. In column 4, it is computed based on human mobility index (HMI) according to
O¨zak (2010, 2018). Geographic controls for both first and second stages include latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation,
land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability, wheat suitability, and malaria risk. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in
1750 for first stage, and in 1990 for second stage. Robust standard errors in parentheses, followed by p-values in brackets. ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table A.21: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: Include Bangladesh and Pakistan
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure 4.383∗∗∗ 1.616∗∗∗ 1.449∗∗∗
(0.316) (0.384) (0.377)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Population density Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No Yes
Standardized beta coefficient 0.275 0.101 0.091
R2 0.550 0.824 0.841
Observations 757 757 757
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is district (in India plus Bangladesh and Pakistan). Dependent variable is ln(0.01+
Luminosity) averaged between 1992-2010. Variable of interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles between 1000-1757 with
a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land quality,
dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability, wheat suitability, and malaria risk. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1990. Robust
standard errors in parentheses, followed by p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table A.22: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: IV: Include Bangladesh and Pakistan
Panel A: First Stage
Dependent variable: Pre-Colonial Conflict Exposure
(1) (2) (3)
Cost distance to Kyhber Pass 0.180∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗
(0.020) (0.026) (0.024)
[0.000] [0.002] [0.012]
Population density Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No Yes
R2 0.327 0.648 0.671
Observations 757 757 757
Panel B: Second Stage
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure 6.972∗∗∗ 5.926∗∗∗ 5.305∗∗∗
(0.895) (1.903) (1.998)
[0.000] [0.002] [0.008]
Population density Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No Yes
Anderson-Rubin p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic 80.354 8.344 5.814
Observations 757 757 757
Notes. Estimation method is 2SLS. Unit of analysis is district (in India plus Bangladesh and Pakistan). In Panel A (first stage), dependent
variable is pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers, while variable of
interest is cost distance to Khyber Pass (computed as squared ruggedness). In Panel B (second stage), dependent variable is ln(0.01+
Luminosity) averaged between 1992-2010, while variable of interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure between 1000-1757 with a cutoff
distance of 250 kilometers, as instrumented by cost distance to Khyber Pass. Geographic controls for both first and second stages
include latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability, wheat suitability,
and malaria risk. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1750 for first stage, and in 1990 for second stage. Robust standard

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.25: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: Colonial Controls
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure 1.263∗∗∗ 1.265∗∗∗ 0.922∗∗ 0.951∗∗
(0.377) (0.379) (0.406) (0.417)







Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standardized beta coefficient 0.091 0.091 0.102 0.105
R2 0.817 0.817 0.856 0.856
Observations 634 634 166 166
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is district. Dependent variable is ln(0.01 + Luminosity) averaged between 1992-
2010. Variable of interest is pre-colonial conflict exposure to land battles between 1000-1757 with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers.
DirectRule is a dummy variable that equals 1 for direct British rule. %NonLandlord measures the proportion of a district under a non-
landlord revenue system in British India. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation, land
quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability, wheat suitability, and malaria risk. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in 1990.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.27: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: Post-1757 Conflict Controls
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure 1.483∗∗∗ 1.492∗∗∗ 1.461∗∗∗ 1.489∗∗∗
(0.393) (0.375) (0.389) (0.418)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Colonial conflict exposure (1758-1839) -0.109 0.005
(0.735) (0.742)
[0.882] [0.995]
Colonial conflict exposure (1840-1946) -0.679∗ -0.679∗
(0.406) (0.408)
[0.095] [0.097]
Post-colonial conflict exposure (1947-2010) -0.136 -0.055
(3.139) (3.151)
[0.965] [0.986]
Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standardized beta coefficient 0.096 0.096 0.094 0.096
R2 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.849
Observations 660 660 660 660
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is district. Dependent variable is ln(0.01+ Luminosity) averaged between 1992-2010.
All conflict exposure variables measure conflict exposure to land battles with a cutoff distance of 250 kilometers. Variable of interest is
pre-colonial conflict exposure between 1000-1757. The first colonial conflict exposure variable spans 1758-1839, while the second spans
1840-1946. The post-colonial conflict exposure variable spans 1947-2010. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, altitude,
ruggedness, precipitation, land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability, wheat suitability, and malaria risk. Population density is
ln(PopulationDensity) in 1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses, followed by p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table A.28: Pre-Colonial Conflict and Economic Development: Alternative Exposure Measures
Dependent variable: Ln(0.01+Luminosity)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-colonial conflict exposure












(# conflicts in convex hull, by conflict group) 0.011∗∗∗
(0.003)
[0.000]
Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standardized beta coefficient 0.023 0.081 0.099 0.115
R2 0.846 0.848 0.847 0.848
Observations 660 660 660 660
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is district. Dependent variable is ln(0.01+ Luminosity) averaged between 1992-2010.
Variable of interest is one of four alternative measures of pre-colonial conflict exposure. In the first alternative, we count the number
of conflicts for each pre-colonial state, and assign these conflicts to the district that houses the state’s capital. In the second alternative,
we compute conflict exposure again using Equation 1, replacing the locations of conflicts with those of the capitals of the pre-colonial
states that participated in them. In the third alternative, we compute the convex hull for each participant according to the geographical
coordinates of the conflicts in which that participant took part, treating all districts that intersect this convex hull as affected by a
conflict. For each district, we count the number of conflicts by which they are so treated. In the fourth alternative, we compute the
convex hull for each broad group of conflicts (e.g., “Later Mughal-Maratha Wars”) as classified by Jaques (2007). For further details of the
construction of these variables, see Subsection ??. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, altitude, ruggedness, precipitation,
land quality, dry rice suitability, wet rice suitability, wheat suitability, and malaria risk. Population density is ln(PopulationDensity) in
1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses, followed by p-values in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10% level.
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